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In his latest work, Sortir de la grande nuit, the Cameroonian social theorist
Achille Mbembe nuances his description of the ontological status of the
postcolonial African subject, which he had theorized extensively in his best-
known text, On the Postcolony, and at the same time exploits the conceptual
resources of a number of Jean-Luc Nancy’s lexical innovations. This recent
text is also a reprise of an earlier autobiographical essay, and the gesture of
this ‘reinscription’ is critical to our understanding of Mbembe’s status as a
contemporary ‘postcolonial thinker’, and the way in which he positions himself
in relation to a certain intellectual genealogy of postcolonial theory. Within this
trajectory, I argue that we can read fruitfully his relationship to three influential
figures: Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy and Ruben Um Nyobè.
Keywords: Mbembe, postcolonial Africa, dis-enclosure, Derrida, Nancy,
Ruben, genealogy
My title is taken from an early essay published in 1993 by the celebrated
Cameroonian social theorist, Achille Mbembe, ‘Écrire l’Afrique à
partir d’une faille’ (Writing Africa From a Rupture), an expression
which he borrows from Michel de Certeau’s The Writing of History
(1975):
I do not need the pretext of ‘ex-patriation’ to ask myself—or others, like
Mudimbe, or Appiah, or whoever else, depending on the circumstance, such as
Mongo Beti or Ngugi wa Thiong’o—where I speak from, what I am writing,
and where the authority comes from that allows me to do so. One should
simply understand that from the outset, there is what Michel de Certeau called
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a ‘genealogical misfortune’, the kind that means we are all born and grow
up ‘somewhere’, and which inscribes us, whether we like it or not, within a
lineage that it is impossible to choose, or indeed to justify, or separate ourselves
from.1
Mbembe’s text recounts his childhood in the village of Malandè in
the south of Cameroon, his gradual awakening to the violence and
corruption of president Paul Biya’s political regime, his complex and
explicitly sensualized engagement with Christianity, his first texts on
the relationship between the Church and the State in Cameroon—
Afriques indociles (Rebellious Africas)— and the books and people
whose influence marked him decisively (a long list of distinguished
Africanists, such as Bogumil Jewsiewicki, Peter Geschiere, V. Y.
Mudimbe, and Mamadou Diouf, as well as a diverse array of
intellectuals and writers: Gustavo Guttiérez, Paulo Freire, Jean-Marc
Éla, Frantz Fanon, Sony Labou Tansi, Ruben Um Nyobè, and then
later during his time in Paris, Foucault, Castoriadis, Elias, de Certeau,
Bataille, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, Lévinas, Lacan). He narrates
his disillusionment and constant quarrels with those in power, and
his sudden departure for the United States, to the University of
Pennsylvania, where he was teaching at the time he wrote this essay,
with a mixture of intense nostalgia and bitterness, and as he explains,
it is the tension of this ambivalence that marks his own ‘identity’ as
an African. The rupture with the place in which his self is rooted
is described as an écart (gap) and a faille (rupture). Yet, as he says,
Cameroon had itself already prefigured this split identity, and enforced
exile, since he is ‘originally from a “non-place” so to speak, a “non-
country”, accidentally named Cameroon’ (WA, 88).
This originary dis-possession, or ‘non-belonging’ (désappartenance)
becomes for him the key to what it means to ‘write Africa’, and the
existential mode in which he will try to do so: ‘I try not to live my
“genealogical misfortune” and my filiation to Africa in terms of a debt
to be repaid, or of a “curse” to be rid of ’ (WA, 89). Anticipating his di-
agnosis of the African postcolony in his later work, and making explicit
reference to Heidegger’s famous meditation on Hölderlin’s question
‘What are Poets for in Times of Distress?’,2 this essay is also repeatedly
described as an attempt to write the ‘night-of-the-postcolonial-
African-world’. As he says towards the end: ‘It is this “night-of-the-
postcolonial-African-world” which agitates me, and causes to tremble
what stands in provisionally for my “identity”’ (WA, 97).
In the opening chapter of his most recently published book, Sortir de
la grande nuit: Essai sur l’Afrique décolonisée (2010) (Emerging from the
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Dark Night: Essay on Decolonized Africa), Mbembe returns to this
1993 autobiographical text, revised and updated so as to take account
of his subsequent work in both the United States and South Africa and
his rise to prominence as one of the most important commentators
of postcolonial Africa, as well as to make a decisive individual
contribution to the debates surrounding the fiftieth anniversary of the
decolonization of much of the African continent.3 The reappearance
and revision of this text is interesting first of all because of Mbembe’s
decision to include it as his opening statement and point of departure,
but equally because of what he leaves out of his earlier version. He
retains the opening reference to Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, but
it is no longer as part of a poeticized thinking about the ‘worldliness’
of contemporary Africa. Instead, he shifts the emphasis, and warns
Africa against the dangers of being seduced by the aesthetic (European)
mythologizing of the world, and its complicity with the worst of
European political history from the last century, a history in which
he also implicates Heidegger’s own political decisions, notably his
relationship to Nazism (EDN, 32). Mbembe’s tone is thus, from the
outset, defiantly political, and he seems intent on situating himself
firmly within the anti-colonial genealogy of thinkers and writers such
as Ruben, Jean-Marc Éla and Fanon. Consequently, the reference to
Ruben Um Nyobè now foregrounds genealogical (familial) ties—
his aunt was the widow of one of Ruben’s close associates in the
Cameroonian Resistance movement, and was assassinated at the same
time as Ruben—and by extension, his sense of belonging to the
history that made him the writer and thinker he is now: ‘I am thus
(. . . ) the product of the first age of postcolonialism—of its childhood
and adolescence’ (EDN, 36). In the rewritten version of his essay,
Mbembe reduces the complex sensualization of his relationship to
the ‘body of Christ’ to a brief statement about the importance of
liberation theology. He excises the extensive list of influential French
intellectuals, and accentuates his time in South Africa at the University
of Witwatersrand, proposing post-apartheid South Africa as a testing
ground for a new form of ‘afropolitanism’, which points the way
towards an affirmative future and new dawn for Africa as a whole,
as it emerges from the ‘night’ of the postcolonial African world.
What is at stake then in this rewriting of his early autobiographical
essay, this ‘reprise’? Emerging from the Dark Night contains a
rather unforgiving critique of France’s inability to engage with
postcolonialism as an intellectual project, or historically to come to
terms with its own colonial past (Mbembe’s phrase is that France
‘decolonized without decolonizing itself ’ (EDN, 47)). Certainly the
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gesture of ‘writing Africa’, articulated initially as a (re-)writing of
the nation which takes the form of a rather ambivalent attachment
to the ‘non-country’ that is Cameroon, has now become far more
transnational in its scope, reflecting Mbembe’s own trajectory, but
also in its emphasis on migration flows between nations within
Africa, and in terms of Africa’s response to the challenges of
contemporary globalization. Yet at the same time, the more stridently
political voice turns eventually to a reaffirmation of the place of the
poetic and the mythological in this cluster of questions, and this
reconceptualization appears to owe much to Jacques Derrida’s and
Jean-Luc Nancy’s thinking, particularly insofar as it relates to the
meaning of globalization, decolonization and the world. We are thus
certainly not dealing with a rather simplistic return to the political,
and a dismissal of Heidegger or ‘French theory’, with its various
debts to Heideggerian thinking. Mbembe talks, for example, of ‘the
poetic productivity of memory and of the religious’ (EDN, 52), and
in the following chapter, entitled ‘Dis-enclosure of the world and the
rise in humanity’, the key term that comes to the fore is Nancy’s
notion of ‘dis-enclosure’ (la déclosion), which the latter articulates
most extensively in his recent The Deconstruction of Christianity’.4
Mbembe thus nuances his description of the ontological status of the
postcolonial African subject, which he had theorized extensively in his
best-known text, On the Postcolony,5 and at the same time exploits the
resources of Nancy’s other lexical innovations. He reframes Nancy’s
concepts in more explicitly political terms (notably his rethinking
of the world in The Creation of the World or Globalization6), and
also links them to Derrida’s own thinking about the question of a
‘democracy to come’.7 How, then, should one take Mbembe’s earlier
autobiographical essay, and the gesture of its ‘reinscription’ or ‘reprise’
in his recent work. What does it mean, in other words, to talk
of Mbembe, today, as a ‘postcolonial thinker’? How does he locate
himself in relation to a certain intellectual genealogy of postcolonial
theory? And within this trajectory, how can we read most fruitfully his
relationship to the two influential figures he privileges— influential in
different ways, of course—Derrida and Ruben Um Nyobè?
Deconstruction As Auto-decolonization
In thinking through Mbembe’s status as a postcolonial thinker, one
quickly runs up against a strange paradox, which Mbembe himself
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commented upon in an interview ‘What is Postcolonial Thinking?’
(December 2006), when discussing the relationship between so-
called ‘French theory’ and postcolonialism, notably ‘what postcolonial
thought owes to the analyses of Foucault, Derrida, even Lacan. We
are dealing then with a reflection that is, in several respects, very
close to a certain current of French thought. The paradox is that
because of its cultural insularity and narcissism, France has cut itself
off from these new adventures in global thought.’8 Leaving aside for
the moment Mbembe’s critique of the limits of postcolonial theory
generally, to which he returns in Emerging from the Dark Night, as
we shall see, the paradox he foregrounds here is that even though
‘French theory’ has been at the origin of many of the most influential
developments in ‘postcolonial thought’— and Mbembe prefers this
term to ‘theory’, since as he points out, it is not in any sense a
homogenous or fully constituted body of thought—France itself
has remained notoriously resistant to reflecting self-critically on its
colonial past.9 Several commentators have consequently begun to
trace genealogical lines of influence, and to make a strong case for
the francophone African ‘roots’ of postcolonial theory, one in which
the work of Derrida plays a perhaps surprisingly pivotal role.10 This
genealogical narrative deserves closer attention, particularly in light of
Mbembe’s own revived ‘debt to deconstruction’ in his latest book, and
the question of debt and influence generally within the evolution of
postcolonial theory (including, for example, Valentin Mudimbe’s debt
to Sartre and Foucault).
Robert Young was perhaps the first critic to link Derrida’s work to
postcolonial questions in his 1990 volume White Mythologies, where he
claimed that Derrida had always challenged the founding assumptions
of colonialist ideology, beginning with Of Grammatology, insofar as
his meticulous analysis of the historical privileging of speech over
writing in the Western metaphysical tradition took the form of a
critique of ethnocentrism.11 Young thus challenges a common materialist
postcolonial view of deconstruction, and repositions Derrida’s work
within a more militant Francophone anti-colonial genealogy, placing
him alongside other French writers and theorists who have, or had,
close biographical or intellectual ties with Algeria (Hélène Cixous,
François Lyotard, Pierre Bourdieu), a list he extends to include the
more familiar figures of Sartre, Fanon, Albert Memmi and Abdelkebir
Khatibi. Mbembe’s own self-reinscription within this intellectual and
political history at the beginning of Emerging from the Dark Night
could perhaps be read in a similar vein. Pursuing this genealogy in
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a later essay, ‘Deconstruction and the Postcolonial’, Young argues
that once Derrida moved to metropolitan France from Algeria, his
early experiences were translated into a permanent and continuous
political subversiveness, and his ideas were subsequently taken up by
minority, migrant and immigrant groups, and applied to their own
political situations.12 Young has been criticized for not giving sufficient
weight to the historical fact of Derrida’s lack of involvement in any
actual struggle for independence, armed or otherwise, although one
might argue, conversely, that Young’s reading overplays (or perhaps
overly literalizes) the autobiographical, and demonstrates the risk of
reducing deconstruction to an essentially thematic set of programmatic
statements. In his eagerness to prove materialist critics and their version
of intellectual history wrong, Young is constructing an alternative
grand narrative, which produces the sort of thematic coherence that
might be the very object of critique of a deconstructive reading.13
Within the context of the broader questions about the history of
postcolonial thought, even if we accept Young’s genealogical narrative,
we still seem to be caught epistemologically within a form of binaristic
oppositional thinking, since whether deconstruction and postcolonial
theory are seen as antagonistic modes of thinking and analysis, or as
partner theories (where the claim is that this complicity has simply
been misrecognized), both do so on the basis of an assumption of a shared
heritage or interdependent history. In an attempt to move beyond this
impasse, we have witnessed more recently a number of very productive
alliances between postcolonial theory and theories of globalization,
subaltern studies and transnational cultural studies. The problem
then, however, is that any straightforward dialectical understanding
of history becomes inherently problematic, since postcolonial theory
(at least a postcolonial theory that takes seriously the epistemological
destabilization foregrounded by deconstruction) puts into question the
very structure of a ‘genealogical narrative’.
Mbembe adopts a similar critical position early on with respect to
African socialist experiments, and Africanist Marxism more generally,
lamenting its ‘positivist rigidity, its empiricist infertility, and its
lack of anthropological density’ (WA, 78). Mbembe’s critique will
inform the anti-positivist approach and sociologically rich analyses of
contemporary African society we find in his later work, particularlyOn
the Postcolony. The sense of being part of a politically radical African
heritage continues to haunt him, nevertheless, and with this in mind,
we might turn back to his own relationship to deconstructive thinking,
which is also often caught within narratives of problematic genealogy
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and debt, and here I am thinking most particularly of Derrida’s debt
to a certain ‘spirit of Marxism’ in Specters of Marx. In this text, Derrida
deals with the problematic heritage of Marxist theory, and Marxism
generally, but reads Marx in the context of a more fundamental
argument that no inheritance or legacy can be understood according
to a model of simple transparent transmission of information. Derrida
talks of the ‘radical and necessary heterogeneity of an inheritance’ (my
emphasis).14 In the context of his reading of Marx, Derrida terms
this uncertain status ‘spectrality’, that is, both the ghost or ‘spirit’
of Marx, and how we might thus conceive of the ontology of this
spectral presence. As he puts it, whenever we deal with a legacy we
are always confronted by an aporia: if such legacies were simple, and
had univocal, transparent meaning, or were cleansed of the possibility
of variable or contradictory interpretation, we would no longer be
within a genealogical relationship, with all its problematic ‘readability’,
and radical ambivalence. One could say that this aporetic logic also
informs Mbembe’s own writing.
Otherwise Responsible
Mbembe is often equally critical of Marxism and indigenism, the two
dominant political ideologies in postcolonial Africa, in all their various
guises (he sometimes refers to these rather wryly as ‘the red and the
black’). Like Mudimbe, Mbembe points out that many Africanist
discourses even today continue to be informed by an appeal to authen-
ticity and tradition. This determines to a significant extent Mbembe’s
turn to postcolonial thought, and the conceptual resources of French
theory more broadly, but as we saw earlier, he also insists on the need
to extend and rethink postcolonial theory, saying that if it is to retain its
relevance, it will need to respond with greater urgency to the shifting
priorities of contemporary global politics, as well as the complexity
of everyday life in the ‘African postcolony’. His criticism is threefold:
firstly, its tendency to privilege the single moment of colonization
within the long history of formerly colonized societies; secondly, the
conflation of resistance (anti-colonial or otherwise) with the very
different problematic of subalternity; and finally, the overemphasis on
the language of ‘difference’ and ‘alterity’, and the consequently closed
and constraining nature of this discourse (EDN, 140).
Given Mbembe’s sense of the limits of postcolonial theory, and his
rejection of nativism, as well as Western, neo-liberalist or Marxist
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political models, one might be led to ask what remains, or what sustains
his own discourse. How, in other words, could we read Mbembe’s
‘debt’ to deconstruction more productively, and particularly in light of
the emphasis he accords it in his recent book, Emerging from the Dark
Night?
Although barely a ghostly presence in Mbembe’s On the Postcolony,
Derrida nevertheless occupies a commanding position at the start of
the chapter ‘Of commandement’, with a passing reference to Derrida’s
‘Force of Law’. Instead of taking Mbembe at his word that the
reference is of minimal significance, it might be worth dwelling for
a while on Derrida’s text in relation to Mbembe’s argument. In the
section of ‘Force of Law’ that Mbembe is referring to, Derrida teases
out the relationship between law, justice, power and violence, and
focuses on the tautology of the founding moment of a law, that is,
how the legality of this violence can only be, but also has to be,
justified and ‘naturalized’ retrospectively by the juridical system it
institutes. In fact, as Derrida reminds us, there is no such thing as
‘natural’ violence; an earthquake, for example, is not naturally violent,
but we are using a figure of speech, or talking symbolically, when we
describe it as such.15 This naturalization of violence is unavoidable to
the institution of a so-called ‘natural’ law, in which the ends then justify
the means— as is the case most obviously with colonial conquest and
rule—but this ‘performative tautology’, as Derrida terms it, is not
limited to tyrannical regimes, since even more democratically self-
conscious systems of justice are caught within the same logical aporia
of the founding moment. What is interesting is that although Mbembe
dismisses Derrida’s text as ‘dealing with a different issue’, he goes on
to describe the institutionalization of violence in Africa as unfolding
in successive stages in precisely the way that Derrida does (echoing his
conceptualizing of ‘archi-violence’ in his reading of Lévi-Strauss in
Of Grammatology, for example). So for Mbembe the second violence
is the process of legitimation of colonial rule, which provides the
language to justify the first violence (as well as its necessity), and to
arrogate to itself the authority of its universalizing mission. Mbembe
then sees a third violence as the normalization and socialization of this
authority as it gradually permeates all aspects of colonial life. Colonial
rule thus produces the figure, and indeed an entire ‘imaginary’, of the
native, and by extension the belief in its own dominion over nature,
and its civilizing mission. According to Mbembe, this rationale, or
colonial rationality, is re-appropriated by postcolonial regimes after
Independence, and the relations of subjection are perpetuated by a
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process of the indigenization of the State that colonialism had set
in motion. This can be seen, for example, in the ways in which
elements of ancestral tradition are appropriated and ‘reinvented’ by
African potentates in order to consolidate their power. Governance
and the exercise of violent power are thus indissociable, and a logical
extension of the violent origins from which they have emerged. So, for
Mbembe, both the potentate and the increasingly animalized African
subject are defined by their mutual dependence on this systemic
violence.
A similarly brief but telling allusion to Derrida surfaces in the earlier
essay, ‘Writing Africa’. Referring to the liberation theologist, Gustavo
Guttiérez, Mbembe says:
He also helped me to understand Christianity as a narrative that is critical of
powers, of potentates, of authorities, a social poetics, a subversive dream and a
partisan memory, the enactment of a language which, to borrow J. Derrida’s terms
in talking of something else, commits one to assuming a sort of responsibility that
acquits one in advance of all other responsibility. (WA, 77)
Derrida’s understanding of responsibility involves a commitment to
a kind of redoubled responsibility to the constitutive impossibility
of responsibility, in the traditional juridical sense of the term.16
Mbembe’s own relationship (and debt) to the particular African history
and genealogy into which he inscribes himself could be read as a
kind of ‘deconstructive’ responsibility, and his writing in this sense
explicitly distances itself from both ‘materialist’ postcolonial theory
(with its unquestioned assumptions about the representative function
of language generally) as well as radical political discourse, despite the
anti-colonial heritage in which it is rooted.
One might, in this regard, look briefly at Derrida’s text
Monolingualism of the Other as an interesting parallel to Mbembe’s
argument about ‘colonial sovereignty’, since it may allow us to bring
into sharper focus certain underlying commonalities between the two
respective projects. One of Derrida’s lines of enquiry concerns the
relationship between colonialism and the sense of one’s ownership of
the language one speaks, or of how language is used as a means of
appropriation, of self as well as of other. As he says, ‘originary violence’
means that there is no such thing as property to begin with. Culture
and colonialism are bound together in what Derrida terms an ‘essential
coloniality’, by which he means that if colonialism is the process of
appropriating the other as self, and reinscribing alterity as identity, then
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all culture, to the extent that it is monocultural, is essentially colonial.
As Derrida’s argument unfolds, he makes a strong claim for the political
effectiveness of deconstruction being precisely at this foundational
level, and in terms of its ability to ‘read’ the diverse forms of symbolic
appropriation. The rather ambivalent inclusion/exclusion of Derrida
in Mbembe’s texts suggests a degree of uncertainty about where he
fits in relation to some of the other theoretical sources Mbembe
cites, but by the time he writes Emerging from the Dark Night, the
acknowledgement of intellectual debt is certainly much more overt,
at the same time as his own text is more politically interventionist. It is
at the level of strategic (foundational) intervention, I would argue, that
we can best read the emphatically political re-appropriation of both
Derrida and Nancy in Emerging from the Dark Night.
The privileged concept for Mbembe in his most recent text is Jean-
Luc Nancy’s term ‘dis-enclosure’ (déclosion), which is a neologism
used principally by Nancy to re-read Christian motifs in a number
of thinkers and literary traditions. For Nancy, as Mbembe points
out, this term indicates the act of opening up something that is
not only closed, but also enclosed, such as an enclosure. It is
thus a profoundly transformative action, that is at the same time a
coming into being, or éclosion (literally: hatching). As Mbembe puts
it: ‘The idea of déclosion includes that of éclosion, of an eruption,
or advent of something new, of an opening out’ (EDN, 68). The
term déclosion is thus adopted by Mbembe as a paronomastic link-
word joining together éclosion, déclosion and décolonisation, connecting
Nancy’s (post-)phenomenological rethinking of being and the world
to the radically political anti-colonialism of Fanon and his successors,
in that decolonization is essentially about reclaiming a world, and
one’s place within the world. This allows for the possibility of
a return to the hidden and perhaps neglected creative political
force of the Négritude philosophy of Léopold Sedar Senghor, whose
vision for the future of Africa has, since Independence, been largely
discredited as regressive or essentialist, certainly in relation to the more
politically uncompromising voices of thinkers such as Césaire and
Fanon. It is, however, precisely Senghor’s reflection on universalism—
that is, how we can think the specificity of Africa in relation to
the question of universal humanism—which echoes closely Nancy’s
conceptualization of ‘being-in-common’, articulating the singularity
of existence as a necessary relationship of sharing, of partage. This is
how Mbembe brings Fanon and Senghor back together:
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In his [Nancy’s] eyes, this ‘making common’ (mise en commun) is the basis for the
rebirth of the world, and the coming of a mixed universal community, governed
by the principle of a sharing of both differences, and of what is unique, and in
this respect, open to the whole. In the case of Fanon as in that of Senghor, we are
heirs to the whole world. At the same time the world— and thus this legacy—
still remain to be created. The world is in creation, as are we too. (EDN, 70–1)17
For Nancy, Christianity (and monotheistic religion more generally)
plays a determining role in the universalist values which structure the
ways in which the West conceptualizes ‘the world’, and the meaning
of the world (‘the sense of the world’), and this informs a certain
commonly accepted understanding of the nature of contemporary
globalization. Derrida pursues a similar line of argument in Foi et
savoir (Faith and Knowledge), linking the monotheistic (Abrahamic)
traditions of the West more specifically to language, and the
Latinization of Christianity.18 Derrida coins the term mondialatinisation
to describe the inseparability of Western thinking about ‘the world’,
and the spread of Romanized Christianity throughout the world.
Derrida is, for Mbembe, the one thinker (perhaps the only thinker
in his eyes) who reads European imperial history in terms of the
relationship between sovereign domination and animalization (of
Europe’s other), or ‘the thematic of the wolf ’ (EDN, 75), and
Derrida’s analysis corresponds closely to Mbembe’s own discussion
of contemporary African political power in terms of animality.19
This is not to say, however, that Mbembe simply adopts an anti-
European position when he uses Derrida or Nancy in the service of
his own postcolonial thinking. In the interview ‘What is Postcolonial
Thinking?’ cited earlier, Mbembe had addressed this very point:
Postcolonial thought (. . . ) is not an anti-European thought. On the contrary, it is
the product of the encounter between Europe and the worlds it once made into its
distant possessions. In showing how the colonial and imperial experience has been
codified in representations, divisions between disciplines, their methodologies and
their objects, it invites us to undertake an alternative reading of our common
modernity (. . . ), it calls upon Europe to live what it declares to be its origins,
its future and its promise, and to live all that responsibly. If, as Europe has always
claimed, this promise has truly as its object the future of humanity as a whole,
then postcolonial thought calls upon Europe to open and continually relaunch
that future in a singular fashion, responsible for itself, for the Other, and before
the Other.
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Towards the end of this interview, Mbembe sketches out the
connection with Senghor, which he will develop more fully in
Emerging from the Dark Night:
But postcolonial thought is also a dream: the dream of a new form of humanism, a
critical humanism founded above all on the divisions that, this side of the absolutes,
differentiate us. It is the dream of a polis that is universal because ethnically diverse.
It is what, in his poetical writings, Senghor hoped for: the ‘rebirth of the world’.
Remember Ruben
How, then, can we read Mbembe’s avowed debt to, and poeticized
memory of, the Cameroonian anticolonial militant journalist Ruben,
both in the early essay ‘Writing Africa from a Rupture’, and its
rewriting in Emerging from the Dark Night, where the ‘deconstructive’
logic of his postcolonial thinking is foregrounded more openly? Ruben
serves as the focus for a kind of double but contradictory imperative:
inscribing his memory is both an act of commemoration, and a means
of liberation from a past whose history always functions potentially
as an enclosure, a means of containing identity. Writing is thus for
Mbembe an act of honouring an essential attachment to Ruben, to
the political tradition he represents, and to the past and the country
that made him. At the same time he affirms the necessity of the
dissolution, or déclosion, of this bond. Indeed, Ruben could be said
to figure the irretrievable ‘object’ that Africa became for Mbembe
once he left Cameroon, but we can perhaps now better read the
continuing presence of Ruben in his text and in his thinking as a
‘spectral’ object, in much the same way that Derrida talks of the radical
undecidability of the ontology of ghostly presences in Specters of Marx.
In ‘Writing Africa’, Ruben is described as a kind of ghost, neither
present nor absent, neither here nor there, a trace of the ‘night-of-the-
postcolonial-African-world’ who is at the very source of Mbembe’s
writing, or of Mbembe as a writer. He is the gap in which, or from
which Mbembe’s ‘writing Africa’ can emerge, a writing that can only
begin once it has dispelled both the myths of authenticity and of the
illusory promises of radical politics. ‘Writing Africa’ is thus a different
(postcolonial) responsibility that goes beyond the responsibility of
nationalist representation as the speaking ‘for’ one’s people, or one’s
country, or one’s place of origin. In this sense, Mbembe’s Ruben
points to the need for Africa to be other than itself, to look to
the future and beyond itself—what Mbembe proposes towards the
end of Emerging from the Dark Night as a determined, outward-facing
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‘afropolitanism’— and as Derrida reminds us in Specters of Marx, the
undecidable temporality of ghosts always looks to both the future and
the past. The ‘poetics’ of this ‘writing Africa’ is thus ultimately at the
heart of a very strong political agenda:
Afropolitanism is thus not the same thing as Panafricanism or Negritude.
Afropolitanism is a stylistics and a politics, an aesthetics and a certain poetics of the
world. It is a way of being in the world which as a principle refuses any identity
as victim (. . . ). It also takes a political and cultural position with respect to the
nation, to race, and to the question of difference in general. (EDN, 232)
Decolonization as déclosion thus means Africa not only freeing itself
from the continuing legacy of colonialism in all its forms, and staking
a strong and active claim for its place within the contemporary
world, but also honouring responsibly the ghosts of the past, those
absent-present figures who continue to haunt Africa’s not so distant
history. If ‘Writing Africa’ otherwise, as Mbembe argues, means a
certain provincialization of Europe, and the West, in contesting its
marginalization in the contemporary global world, this is also a defiant
and affirmative gesture of asking what the world can thereby learn from
Africa.
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